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The Struggle to Define Character in FCC License Renewal Decisions:
RKO General, Inc.' — The Communications Act of 1934 requires that broad-
cast licensees apply for license renewal every three years.' When a licensee ap-
plies for renewal, its application can be challenged by any person desiring to
take over the license. 3
 When such a challenge occurs, the Federal Communica-
tions Commission (FCC) is charged with the responsibility of determining
which applicant will best serve the "public interest, convenience, and necessi-
ty." 4 This process is essentially accomplished in two steps. First, the Commis-
sion must determine which applicants are minimally qualified to be licensees.
Second, if there is more than one minimally qualified applicant, the FCC must
compare the applicants to decide which one is most qualified.
In making the first determination, the Commission must decide whether
the applicants possess certain basic financial and technical qualifications.' In
addition, the Communications Act specifically requires that the FCC deter-
mine, as a threshold matter, whether applicants meet minimal standards of
character.' The Communications Act, while establishing a character qualifica-
tion, does not define "character." In making such a determination, then, the
FCC relies on its interpretation of that requirement, as reflected in prior FCC
decisions and policy statements.
The procedure for challenging a renewal applicant is as follows. First, an
administrative law judge (ALJ) takes evidence on the issues designated by the
FCC for the purpose of evaluating the minimum qualifications and relative
merit of the applicants.' The ALJ then makes findings of fact and a recommen-
dation as to the disposition of the case.' This decision of the ALJ, known as the
Initial Decision, becomes final unless exceptions are filed with the FCC.' Upon
such an appeal to the FCC, the full Commission may rely on the ALy s find-
ings or reopen the record for further evidence in order to make a decision."'
RKO General, Inc., 78 F.C.C.2d 1 (1980).
2 47 U.S.C. 5 307(d) (1976).
47 U.S.C. 5 308 (1976). Competing applicants for the same frequency in the same
community are known as "mutually exclusive applicants." Only one applicant can be granted
the license. See Jones, Licensing of Major Broadcast Facilities by the Federal Communications Commission,
printed in ACTIVITIES OF REGULATORY AND ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES RELATING TO SMALL
BUSINESS: HEARINGS ON H. RES. 13 BEFORE SUBCOMMITTEE NO. 6 OF THE SELECT COMMIT-
TEE ON SMALL BUSINESS, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess. A87, A112 (Part 1 Appendix 1966).
* 47 U.S.C. 5 307(d) (1976). This casenote will not discuss the RKO case from the
comparative renewal standpoint. For a review of comparative renewal procedures, see Com-
ment, FCC Comparative Renewal Hearings: The Role of the Commission and the Role of the Court, 21 B.0 .
L. REV. 421 (1980); Comment, Comparing the Incomparable: Towards a Structural Model for FCC Com-
parative Broadcast License Renewal Hearings, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 573 (1976); Anthony, Towards
Simplicity and Rationality in the Comparative Broadcast Licensing Proceedings, 24 STAN. L. RF.v.1 (1971).
5
 47 U.S.C. 308(b) (1976) provides: "All applications for station licenses, or
modifications or renewals thereof, shall set forth such facts as the Commission by regulation may
prescribe as to the citizenship, character, and financial, technical, and other qualifications of the
applicant to operate the station-  " Id.
6 It
7 47 C.F.R. 55 1.241, 1.243 (1979).
47 C . F. R. 5 1.267 (1979).
9 47 C.F.R.	 1.276 (1979).
10 Id.
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Decisions of the FCC may be appealed to the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit and, from there, to the United States
Supreme Court."
In accordance with these procedures, RKO General, Inc. (RKO), on
December 31, 1968, filed an application for renewal of its license covering sta-
tion WNAC-TV, Channel 7, in Boston.' 2
 Two challengers, Community
Broadcasting Company (Community) and the Dudley Station Corporation
(Dudley), subsequently filed competing applications for ',ermits to operate on
Channel 7." On December 11, 1969, the FCC designated for hearing the ap-
plications of RKO, Community, and Dudley." Among the issues designated
against RKO was the matter of character qualifications. Specifically, the Com-
mission sought to determine whether RKO was qualified to remain a broadcast
licensee in view of evidence of alleged anticompetitive conduct by RKO and its
parent corporation, General Tire and Rubber Co. (General Tire). 15
At the subsequent series of hearings before an ALJ, extensive evidence
was adduced revealing that RKO and General Tire had engaged in allegedly
anticompetitive reciprocal trade practices in the 1960's. 16 General Tire, for ex-
ample, was found to have conditoned its dealings with certain trucking com-
panies upon the truckers' purchase of General Tire products." RKO's par-
" 47 U.S.C. 402(a)-(j) (1976).
12 RKO General, Inc. entered the radio broadcasting field in 1942, and in 1947 became
one of 37 television stations in the United Status by acquiring WNAC-TV, Channel 7 (Boston),
which it has held continuously since then. RKO General, Inc., 78 F.C.C.2d 1, 152 (1974) (initial
decision). RKO has since acquired 16 broadcasting stations: KHJ, KRTH(FM), KHJ-TV (Los
Angeles, California); WRKO, WROR(FM) (Boston, Massachusetts); WOR, WXLO(FM) ,
WOR-TV (New York, New York); WHBQ (Memphis, Tennessee); KFRC, KKEE(FM) (San
Francisco, California); WGMS (Bethesda, Maryland); WGMS(FM) (Washington, D.C.);
WAXY(FM) (Ft. Lauderdale, Florida); and WFYR(FM) (Chicago, Illinois). Id. at 150-51.
13 On February 28 and July 8, 1969, respectively, Community Broadcasting Company
and The Dudley Station Corporation filed separate' applications for a construction permit to
operate on Channel 7, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. 5 308(a) (1976). 78 F.C.C.2d at 6.
14 RKO General, Inc., 20 F.C.C.2d 846, 848 (1969). See note 3 supra.
is 78 F.C.C.2d at 6-7; RKO is a wholly-owned subsidiary of General Tire. M.G.
O'Neil is chief executive officer of General Tire, and T. F. O'Neil, his brother, serves as Chair-
man of the Board of Directors of both companies. Id. at 61. The anticompetitive issue arose as a
result of alleged illegal trade relations practices by RKO and General Tire whereby General Tire
was using its buying power to induce its suppliers to advertise on RKO stations. These dealings
began with the establishment of a trade relations program in 1961 by General Tire, John G.
Ragsdale was director of the new trade relations division. While RKO did not have a formal
trade relations program, Robert Wilke, hired by RKO in 1960 to serve as a "goodwill am-
bassador or missionary salesman," functioned as RKO's liaison with Ragsdale and had the title
of Director of Corporate Relations. Id. at 8. As a result of trade relations matters, the Depart-
ment of Justice filed a civil action against General Tire, RKO, and other General Tire and RKO
subsidiaries, alleging violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. 15 U.S.C. SS
1,2. Id. at 8-9. The Department of Justice action resulted in a court-approved consent decree,
issued October 21, 1970, precluding General Tire and its subsidiaries from engaging in such
practices for a period of ten years. No judicial finding of guilt was made. Id.
Id. at 9-10. Such practices may be defined as the allocation of a firm's purchase of
goods and services in order to promote the sale of its products. Id. at 33.
' 7 Id. at 9, 262-64.
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ticipation in reciprocal dealings involved an effort by RKO and General Tire
to pressure companies to advertise on RKO stations in exchange for doing
business with General Tire." Despite this evidence, the ALJ held that under
the policy of the FCC as established in prior cases, RKO still not only pos-
sessed minimal character qualifications for license renewal, but also was the
best qualified of the applicants on a comparative basis."'
The initial decision by the ALJ, however, did not end the matter. Follow-
ing the ALJ's decision, evidence of other RKO and General Tire wrongdoing
came to light. Consequently, on December 10, 1975, Community filed a peti-
tion to reopen the record and remand the case for further hearings, based on
this new evidence. 20
 The Commission granted the petition." As a result of
these further proceedings, the FCC adopted the ALJ' s findings of fact relating
to the reciprocal trade practices engaged in by RKO and General Tire, and
found other broadcast-related misconduct by RKO as well as extensive non-
broadcast misconduct by General Tire. 22
The additional broadcast misconduct, the Commission found, consisted of
RKO's filing of inaccurate annual financial reports with the FCC" and
RKO's general lack of candor with the Commission." The inaccuracies in the
financial reports related to RKO's accounting for barter and trade transac-
tions." Such transactions, common in the broadcasting industry, consist of ex-
changes of a station's broadcast time at something other than normal advertis-
ing rates. In return, the broadcaster generally receives goods and services from
the advertiser. 26
 While the FCC does not regulate such transactions, it does re-
quire that barter and trade matters be entered on the licensees' annual finan-
cial reports." The FCC found that RKO improperly reported barter and trade
transactions during the 1970's." This matter involved RKO's method of ac-
counting for these transactions. RKO had always accounted for barters by
memorandum, rather than by entering them on its general ledger." Following
a notice issued by the Commission in February, 1972, reminding licensees to
18 Id. at 10, 289-90, 299-302. See note 15 supra.
19
 78 F.C.C.2d 147 (1974). The decision was issued on June 13, 1974 and released
June 21, 1974. Id. The ALJ found that the trade relations practices of General Tire and its sub-
sidiaries and related candor questions did not warrant a comparative demerit; a moderate com-
parative demerit was assessed for inadequate supervision by RKO in the production of two
shows: The Della Reese Show and Dark Shadows. Id, at 347. The ALJ found RKO's record to
be one of superior performance, a factor outweighing the comparative demerit as well as the
merits of the competing applicants. Id. at 347-48.
20
 Community Petition to Reopen the Record, Enlarge the Issues and Remand for Fur-
ther Hearings (Petition to Reopen). 78 F.C.C.2d at 13-14.
21 Id. at 21-23.
22
 Id. at 38-43, 63, 80.81, 92-93.
23
 Id. at 80.
24 Id. at 92-93.
25 Id. at 80-88.
26 Id. at 81.
27 Id.
23 Id. at 86.
29
 Id. at 81.
412	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 22:409
report all barter transactions annually to the Commission by general ledger
method, RKO continued to account for such transactions in its traditional
manner."
Aside from the inaccurate financial reports, the FCC found that RKO had
exhibited lack of candor in dealing with the Commission throughout the
renewal proceedings. 3 ' The Commission pointed to three specific instances of
RKO's lack of candor. First, the Commission referred to RKO's opposition
brief to a 1977 Community petition to order RKO to comply with FCC
disclosure rules with respect to accounting of barter and trade transactions."
In its opposition to this petition, RKO referred to Community's allegations of
incomplete reporting of the transactions as "sheer speculation."" The Com-
mission considered this characterization of Community's allegations as RKO's
official statement that the financial reports were complete and accurate. 34
Because RKO was aware of inaccuracies in 1977, the Commission found the
opposition lacking in candor. 35 A second matter found by the FCC to be
evidence of RKO's lack of candor was RKO's failure to make a timely report
to the FCC of an SEC investigation of General Tire and its subsidiaries, in-
cluding RKO. 36 Third, the Commission pointed to RKO's opposition brief to
Community's petition to reopen the record, in which RKO asserted that Com-
munity had no basis for its allegations." Community's petition had alleged ex-
tensive nonbroadcast-related misconduct by General Tire and a lack of candor
by RKO in failing to inform the FCC of this misconduct." The SEC investiga-
tion of General Tire later revealed that these allegations were substantially ac-
curate, and the FCC concluded that RKO probably was aware of these matters
at the time it filed its opposition."
3° Id. at 81-82.
Id, at 92-93.
32 Id. at 101-03.
" Id. at 102.
Id.
35 It at 103.
36 Id. at 99-101.
37 Id. at 93, 95.
" Id. at 93. Specifically, Community pointed to violations of the Commission's rules,
sections 1.514 and 1.65.
Section 1. 514(a) provides, in pertinent part: "Each application shall include all infor-
mation called for by the particular form on which the application is required to be filed." 47
C.F.R. 73.3514(a) (1979). Community alleged that RKO violated this rule by failing to
disclose its secret interest in a Foreign bank account (Fructal) through which it was concealing
funds related to Chilean operations. 78 F.C.C.2d at 13-14.
Section 1.65 states, in pertinent part:
Whenever there has been a substantial change as to any other matter which may
be of decisional significance in a Commission proceeding involving the pending
application, the applicant shall as promptly as possible and in any event within '30
days, unless good cause is shown, submit a statement furnishing such additional or
corrected information as may be appropriate ... .
47 C.F.R. 5 1.65 (1979). Community alleged that RKO failed to comply with section 1.65 by not
informing the Commission of the SEC's investigation of General Tire. 78 F.C.C.2d at 13-14.
39 Id. at 93-97. Since RKO had requested extra time to prepare its opposition and had
been in possession of documents relating to the General Tire misconduct, the FCC found that
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In addition to the broadcast-related issues of reciprocity, inaccurate finan-
cial reports, and lack of candor, the FCC made extensive findings regarding
General Tire's nonbroadcast misconduct. These findings were based largely on
evidence adduced as a result of the SEC investigation. That investigation
ended in May, 1976, with General Tire entering into a consent decree which,
among other things, established a Special Review Committee to investigate the
alleged General Tire misconduct. The investigation produced a Special Report
which was accepted into evidence by the FCC in the RKO license renewal pro-
ceedings. 40 Among the findings by the Commission as a result of the report
were that General Tire had engaged in extensive wrongdoing since the 1960's.
These activities included making improper domestic political contributions,
defrauding corporate affiliates, making improper foreign payments, and keep-
ing improper accounts.'"
Having found the above described broadcast and nonbroadcast miscon-
duct by RKO and General Tire, the Commission considered facts in mitiga-
tion of that misconduct. The Commission reviewed in some detail RKO's past
broadcast record at WNAC-TV. Although comparison with other Boston area
television stations revealed to the Commission that RKO was deficient with
respect to several categories, including news, local programming and public af-
fairs, 42 the Commission placed RKO's performance "within the bounds of
average performance of all licensees." 43
Other mitigating factors were considered. For example, RKO and
General Tire had taken certain corrective measures to counteract the miscon-
duct and to assure that it would not recur in the future. With respect to the
reciprocal trade agreements discovered by the ALJ, for instance, the Commis-
sion noted that both companies had entered into a consent decree prohibiting
such practices through 1980. 44 On the subject of barter and trade transactions,
RKO must also have known that Community's allegations were not unfounded. Id. at 95 &
n.408.
" The history of this investigation began in 1975. On December 5, 1975 and January
22, 1976 the SEC submitted letters of inquiry to General Tire officials regarding certain of the
alleged activities. 78 F.C.C.2d at 12, 15. These inquiries resulted in a formal order of investiga-
tion against General Tire in late February, 1976, and a complaint for injunctive and certain an-
cillary relief against General Tire and M.G. O'Neil on May 10, 1976. Id. at 16. The complaint
cited substantially all of the allegations made by Community in its December 10, 1975 Petition to
Reopen, along with other allegations. Id. at 16. These actions resulted in a court-approved final
judgment of permanent injunction incorporating the consent and undertaking of General Tire
and the consent of M.G. O'Neil (May 10, 1976). Id. at 17. The permanent injunction, pro-
hibiting the concealment of the misconduct alleged in the SEC complaint, did not admit or deny
any of the allegations in the complaint, including "unlawful political contributions, unlawful
payments to foreign government officials, and the overbilling of affiliates and subsidiaries." Id.
The decree also established a Special Review Committee which was to conduct a thorough in-
vestigation of the matters in the complaint and issue a written report on the findings, later called
the Special Report. Id. RKO informed the FCC of the SEC matter and the consent decree on
May 14, 1976. Id. The Special Report, issued on or about July 1, 1977, was submitted to the
FCC on July 19, 1977. Id. at 19. It was formally accepted into evidence on July 20, 1979. Id. at
22.
" 78 F.C.C.2d at 63.
42 Id. at 107.
" Id.
" Id. at 110.
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the Commission found that in 1977, RKO converted to the general ledger
method of recording in order to comply with FCC rules and formed committees
to assure adequate accounting controls in the future." In mitigation of the non-
broadcast misconduct by General Tire, the FCC noted that General Tire had
instituted a remedial program even prior to the issuance of the Special Report,
and subsequently had adopted all of the recommendations of the Special
Review Committee 
. 46
In summary, the FCC considered numerous findings of fact in assessing
RKO's fitness as a broadcast licensee. First, the Commission found that RKO
and General Tire had engaged in reciprocal trade practices in the 1960's. In
this respect the FCC relied on the facts revealed in the Initial Decision by the
AL,]. The final decision, however, was based, in addition, on matters revealed
when the case was reopened. Those additional matters were RKO's filing of
inaccurate annual financial reports, lack of candor with the Commission, and
extensive nonbroadcast misconduct by RKO's parent corporation, General
Tire and Rubber Co. After considering this new evidence and taking into ac-
count RKO's past broadcast record, as well as corrective measures by both
companies, the FCC, in a 4-3 decision, held that RKO lacked the requisite
character qualifications to remain the licensee of WNAC-TV. 47
The decision to disqualify RKO based on these facts potentially marks a
significant shift in FCC policy as it relates to character evaluation of renewal
applicants. The Commission, in RKO, diverged from the standards applied in
prior cases involving broadcast-related misconduct. In addition, while the
Commission in the past has taken a nominally negative view toward nonbroad-
cast business misconduct by licensees and corporate parents," in prior cases
such misconduct has been overlooked or outweighed by other factors, such as
the applicants' longstanding, excellent or superior service in the public in-
terest." In RKO, however, the Commission denied license renewal by giving
" Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 120. The decision, announced on January 24, 1980, adopted June 4, 1980, and
released June 6, 1980, has the effect of disqualifying RKO from retaining licenses in Boston
(WNAC-TV), Los Angeles (KHJ-TV), id. at 355-56 (1980), and New York (WOR-TV), it at
358 (1980). The Los Angeles and New York cases had been conditioned on the outcome of the
Boston proceeding. See RKO General, Inc. (KHJ-TV), 44 F.C.C.2d 123, 137-38 (1973), aff'd
sub nom. Fidelity Television, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir.), rehearing denied, 515 F.2d 703
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 926 (1975), where the United States Court of Appeals affirmed
the Commission's decision to grant RKO renewal for KHJ-TV, conditioning renewal on the
outcome of the Boston proceeding. See also RKO General, Inc. (WOR-TV), 69 F.C.C.2d 461
(1978) (Commission grant of license renewal for WOR-TV, subject to resolution of the Boston
proceeding, which would have the effect of res judicata on the New York license renewal).
The decision, in addition to stripping RKO of television licenses in three major cities,
may affect RKO's retention of its other 13 broadcast licenses. 78 F.C.C.2d at 118.
4" See Report on Uniform Policy as to Violation by Applicants of the Laws of United
States, 42 F.C.C.2d 399 (1951).
49 See text at notes 98-108 infra for a discussion of General Electric and Westinghouse
license renewals (misconduct outweighed by outstanding broadcast record). See also text and
notes at notes 173-74, 224-29 infra, for a discussion of Miami Valley Broadcasting Corporation




"substantial weight" to nonbroadcast misconduct, while discounting previous
service by the licensee. 50 Thus, RKO suggests that in the future the Commis-
sion intends to use its licensing powers more aggressively to discourage miscon-
duct by companies engaging in broadcasting.
This casenote will analyze the FCC's failure in RKO to articulate a
workable standard for evaluating character in broadcast renewal applicants.
To accomplish this, the casenote will first review the development of FCC
policy concerning character qualifications. This historical review will
demonstrate that prior to RKO the FCC had effectively minimized character as
a factor in assessing renewal applicants by applying its criteria too flexibly.
Having traced the history of the FCC's treatment of character, the casenote
will describe the Commission's reasoning in RKO. The analysis following the
description will show that RKO, although nominally following established
policy, is in fact a departure from the Commission's approach in earlier cases.
Finally, it will be suggested that this departure may serve to undermine the
reasonable expectations of renewal applicants without providing them with a
foundation on which to build new expectations.
I. HISTORY OF THE FCC'S ATTEMPT TO FORMULATE
A CHARACTER STANDARD
The Communications Act of 1934 made "character" a basic qualification
for a broadcast license." The statute, however, did not define "character,"
but left the issue for the FCC to develop. Since the enactment of the Com-
munications Act, that task has been especially difficult for the FCC to ac-
complish. At first the Commission attempted to define character on an ad hoc
basis, but no intelligible standard emerged." Subsequently, the FCC issued a
policy statement in an effort to summarize the Commission's position on
character and to indicate how character would be assessed in future cases."
Even after the policy statement, however, the Commission continued to ex-
perience difficulty in applying the character standard uniformly. While reserv-
ing for itself very broad powers in its earlier cases and in the policy statement,
the FCC in recent practice has exercised those powers very sparingly.
A. Early Decisional Law: 1940-1950
In its earliest cases, the FCC was somewhat lenient concerning a range of
misconduct it deemed permissible by broadcast licensees.". In the early 1940's,
however, a shift towards more critical evaluation of licensee conduct became .
5° 78 F.C.C.2d at 71,
5 ' 47 U.S.C. 5 308(b) (1976).
52 See text at notes 54-66 infra.
" Report on Uniform Policy as to Violation by Applicants of the Laws of the United
States, 42 F.C.C.2d 399 (1951).
54 Note, Broadcast License Revocation for Deception and Illegal Transfer, 15 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 425 (1947), reviews cases prior to 1946 where the FCC had been more lenient in such mat-
ters. See also Brown, Character and Candor Requirements for FCC Licenses, 22 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 644 (1957), for a summary of some of the cases between 1946 and the mid-1950's.
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evident. In WOKO, Inc." the FCC asserted its power to invoke the character
standard to deny renewal for misconduct directly related to a licensee's
status. 56 In this case the licensee, WOKO, had concealed for 12 years the true
ownership of the station's capital stock." The Commission denied license
renewal, holding that these recurring misrepresentations by WOKO precluded
the applicant from meeting the standards of candor under the Communications
Act. 58 Having failed to meet these standards, the Commission reasoned,
WOKO could not be trusted to remain a broadcast licensee." Thus, in WOKO
the FCC took its first step in developing a character standard.
In the late 1940's and early 1950's, the Commission extended the scope of
its evaluation of character qualifications beyond an assessment of an
applicant's honesty and candor in dealings with the Commission. In Arde
Bulova," for example, the FCC included in its character evaluation an ex-
amination of the licensees' nonbroadcast business misconduct. 6 ' The ap-
plicants in that case were denied a broadcast license because of their repeated
violations of state and federal laws in conducting their edible oil business."
The FCC reasoned that such nonbroadcast business misconduct deserved con-
siderable weight in judging whether the applicants possessed the "sense of
public responsibility" essential for a broadcast licensee." The license denial,
affirmed subsequently by the United States District Court," represented a
significant extension of FCC licensing power into areas not directly related to
broadcast regulation."
As the early history shows, the Commission carved out fairly broad
powers with respect to character evaluation. In addition to establishing its
authority to deny a license for activity directly related to broadcasting or to
broadcast regulation, the FCC assumed the power to disqualify an applicant
" WOKO, Inc., 10 F.C.C. 454 (1944), rev'd, WOKO, Inc. v. FCC, 153 F.2d 623
(D.C. Cir.), rev'd, FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223 (1946).
56 10 F.C.C. at 466-68.
" Id. at 466-67.
55 Id. at 468.
" Id. In affirming the Commission's license denial, the United States Supreme Court
held that the FCC need not be entirely consistent in deciding apparently comparable cases. FCC
v. WOKO, Inc., at 228. The Court made clear that it is the Commission, not the courts, that
must be satisfied that the public interest standard has been met. Id. at 229.
60 11 F.C.C. 137 (1946).
61 Id. at 142-47.
62 Id, at 148-49. In particular, the applicant had been involved as a defendant in pro-
ceedings concerning illegal conduct such as false and misleading labelling, weight shortages, and
/the r deceptive practices. Id. at 143-47.
65 Id. at 149.
64 Mester v. United States, 70 F. Supp. 118 (E.D.N.Y. 1947).
65 Mansfield Journal Co., 13 F.C.C. 23 (1948), was another case where the FCC
denied a license because of illegal conduct by the applicants. The applicants in Mansfield, owners
of the sole newspaper in Mansfield, Ohio, had engaged in anticompetitive practices by coercing
its advertisers into exclusive contracts which prohibited them from advertising on what was then
the only broadcast station in Mansfield. Id. at 30-32. The decision was affirmed by the appeals
court, which held that the FCC had broad discretionary power to consider unconvicted antitrust




for nonbroadcast-related activity that the FCC believed was indicative of
potential future broadcast-related misconduct. The early cases, however, did
not indicate clearly what kind of misconduct the Commission considered rele-
vant to predicting an applicant's behavior as a licensee. 66
B. The Uniform Policy
In an effort to define how it would use its broad power under the character
standard, the FCC in 1951 attempted to synthesize its various holdings in a
single policy statement. In the Report on Uniform Policy as to Violation by Applicants
of Laws of United States (Uniform Polic_y), 67
 the Commission asserted its authority
to consider violations of law other than breaches of the Communications Act as
a character factor in licensing decisions." While noting that any violation of
federal law would raise a character question worthy of examination, the Com-
mission stated that misconduct would be viewed along with mitigating factors
that might outweigh the negative effect of the violation. 69
 In devising a test for
evaluating unlawful behavior by an applicant, the Commission isolated three
factors. These factors were: (1) whether the misconduct was willful or inadvert-
ent; (2) whether it involved an isolated incident or a pattern of behavior; and
(3) whether it occurred recently or in the remote past."
Regarding the first factor, the Commission considered of prime concern
the practice of willful violations of law." In taking this position, the Commis-
sion stated that deliberate unlawfulness by an applicant raises a presumption
adverse to that applicant'? This factor was of particular importance to the
66 In the Mansfield case, two dissenters, Commissioners Jones and Sterling, doubted
that nonbroadcast misconduct realistically could serve as a prospective predictOr of broadcast
misconduct. 13 F.C.C. at 41. In addition, the dissenters expressed concern about the Commis-
sion's failure to take into account the affirmative qualifications of applicants with character
defects. Id.
67 42 F.C.0 .2d 399.
66 Id. at 400-01. The situations addressed in the Uniform Policy were:
(a) Whether the finding of the violation is in a civil or criminal case.
(b) Whether the finding of violation is by the United States Supreme Court or by
a lower federal court.
(c) Where, after the finding of violation, a decree is entered by an appropriate
court which results in the elimination of the practice which was a violation of
federal law.
(d) Where there has been no finding of violation but a suit has been filed alleging a
violation.
(e) Where there has been no finding of violation or no filing of suit, but the Com-
mission is in possession of information which shows that there has been a viola-
tion of federal law.
42 F.C.0 .2d at 400. With respect to the first two situations, the Commission concluded that
neither the type of suit brought nor the level of the tribunal issuing a decree was a factor in deter-
mining whether the Commission would consider the violations in making licensing decision. Id.
at 403. The FCC also reserved for itself the power to evaluate misconduct in situations (c)-(e),
above, "insofar as it may relate to matters entrusted to the Commission." Id.
69 42 F .C.0 .2d at 402.
7° Id. at 402-03.
7' Id. at 402.
71 Id.
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Commission because the FCC considered willful misconduct fundamentahy i••
consistent with service as a public trustee."
The second and third factors — pattern and recency of conduct — were
related to the Commission's predictive function. Recurrent offenses, establish-
ing a continuing pattern of misconduct, the Commission stated, would be
evidence that an applicant could not be trusted to serve as a responsible
licensee. 74 Cases where an applicant was engaged in unlawful behavior for a
long period of time or was currently engaged in such behavior would raise a
particularly strong presumption against the applicant and impose a heavy
burden of proof on the applicant to show it is qualified." Conversely, isolated
instances of misconduct, or violations occurring in the distant past, followed by
a long period of adherence to law would be of less concern to the
Commission.'fi Having devised this three factor test for evaluating misconduct
by applicants, the FCC added that facts "in extenuation of the violation of
law"" or "other favorable facts and considerations" might outweigh a record
of unlawful conduct." In such a case, an applicant could qualify to operate a
station in the public interest."
In addition to setting forth a test for evaluating character, the FCC ex-
pressed particular concern for violations of antitrust laws." The Commission
stated that because of the difficulty of detecting monopolistic behavior and
because of the potentially negative effect of monopoly on broadcasting, any
such known practices by an applicant, whether or not broadcast-related, must
be considered in evaluating qualifications for a license. 8 ' In this regard, the
Commission established its authority to examine fully an applicant's history of
unlawful conduct, including unconvicted violations of law. 82 By considering
violations of antitrust laws, the Commission continued, its purpose was not to
impose penalties for the transgression itself, but was to look at such violations,
along with other pertinent factors, to determine whether licensing the applicant
was in the public interests' Such decisions, the Commission concluded, would
be reviewed on a case-to-case basis."
The Uniform Policy was the FCC's first formal articulation of a character
standard. In this policy statement, the Commission assumed broad authority
to consider unlawful conduct by license applicants. This authority was not
restricted to violations of the Communications Act, but included the power to
investigate unconvicted violations of other laws. Such unlawful conduct, the
Commission noted, would be evaluated based on three factors: whether it was
" Id.
74 Id.
" Id. at 402-03.
" Id. at 402.
" Id.
78 Id, The Uniform Policy did not spell out what specific factors would serve to mitigate
misconduct. In practice, however, these factors have included broadcast record and remedial
measures. See, e.g., General Electric and Westinghouse in text at notes 98-108 infra.
" 42 F.C.C.2d at 402.
II° Id. at 403-04.
" Id. at 404.
82 Id. at 403.
83 Id. at 401.
" Id. at 402.
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willful, whether it occurred repeatedly, and whether it was recent. Illegal ac-
tivity might be mitigated, however, by favorable evidence. Having assumed
these powers, the Commission concluded that character matters would be
evaluated on a case-to-case basis.
C. The Post-Policy Cases
In the early cases following the adoption of the Uniform Policy, the Com-
mission took a lenient approach in applying the Policy's criteria. Although the
FCC had carved out extensive powers for itself, it chose to exercise them spar-
ingly. With respect to both broadcast and nonbroadcast misconduct, the Com-
mission was reluctant to disqualify an incumbent licensee. The following
discussion will illustrate this trend through a review of three post-policy FCC
decisions.
In National Broadcasting Co." the Commission ignored alleged improper
broadcast-related misconduct by NBC and its parent corporation, RCA, 86 and
granted license renewal. The misconduct related to the acquisition of the sta-
tions for which renewal was sought. In 1955, NBC and Westinghouse Broad-
casting Company applied for and were granted approval for a broadcast station
exchange." In this transaction NBC acquired from Westinghouse radio and
television stations located in Philadelphia. In return, Westinghouse received
NBC's Cleveland radio and television stations, plus $3 million. 88 In 1957, the
FCC, without a hearing, granted NBC renewal of the Philadelphia licenses. 89
Philo) Corporation, a challenger for the licenses, filed a protest to the renewal
and requested a hearing, alleging character deficiencies because of flagrant an-
ticompetitive conduct by NBC and RCA. 9° Philco pointed particularly to
pending civil antitrust actions instituted against NBC and RCA by the Depart-
ment of Justice in connection with coercive behavior by NBC and RCA in the
acquisition of the Philadelphia stations from Westinghouse. Specifically, the
suit alleged that NBC had threatened to withhold network affiliation from
Westinghouse unless it agreed to the exchange. 91 The evidence also revealed
that NBC and RCA had engaged in other broadcast-related anticompetitive
conduct since the mid-1940's, resulting in patent licensing suits as well as
government and private antitrust actions. 92 Nevertheless, Philco's request for a
hearing on these character matters was denied. 93
" National Broadcasting Co., 37 F.C.C. 451 (1963).
" NBC was a wholly-owned subsidiary of RCA. National Broadcasting Co., 44
F.C.C. 1114, 1118 (1957).
87
 37 F.C.C. at 452-54.
88 Id. at 453.
88 Id.
9° 44 F.C.C. 1114, 1116-18 (1957).
vi Id. at 1115 & n.6.
87 Id. at 1115-17. NBC, for example, had been engaged in a series of quiz-show rigging
schemes during the 1950's which led to an investigation by the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce in 1959. 37 F.C.C. at 481-83. RCA's misconduct in the patent licensing
area resulted in criminal charges and the imposition of a fine upon RCA's plea of nolo con-
tendere in 1958. Id. at 461. The judgment entered in the criminal action described the RCA of-
fense as unlawful restraint of trade and monopolization in the manufacture, distribution and sale
of radio equipment and in the licensing of radio patents. Id.
88 44 F.C.C. at 1123.
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While acknowledging these allegations, the Commission, in denying a
hearing, stated that it would not act on "unresolved complaints" filed in the
courts until they were resolved by those courts." In so deciding, the Commis-
sion did not address fully either the pattern of broadcast-related anti-
competitive conduct by the licensee and its parent corporation, or the recency
of that conduct. Thus, in NBC, the Commission refrained from taking an ac-
tive part in assessing these unconvicted violations of law as it had indicated that
it would in the Uniform. Policy. 95 Rather, the evaluation of character in NBC il-
lustrates the FCC's reluctance to deny license renewal to an incumbent
licensee. Although the Commission asserted broad powers, it shied away from
using them.
NBC represents the Commission's post-policy treatment of broadcast-
related misconduct by an incumbent licensee. If possible the FCC tended to
minimize the significance of broadcast-related wrongdoing as an indicator of
character deficiencies. Not surprisingly, two cases decided in the early 1960's
show that the Commission took a similar view regarding nonbroadcast miscon-
duct.
Westinghouse Broadcasting Co." and General Electric Co." reflect the Commis-
sion's lenient approach to nonbroadcast misconduct. Westinghouse and General
Electric involved extensive anticompetitive conduct by nonbroadcast subsidi-
aries of Westinghouse Electric Corporation and General Electric Company."
As a result of this misconduct, in 1961 employees of both companies were con-
victed on charges of bid-rigging and price-fixing in the amount of $1.75 billion
annually. 99 When Westinghouse and General Electric applied for license
renewals, the FCC was aware of the history of illegal activity that led to these
convictions. Despite this anticompetitive conduct, however, the Commission
granted renewal without hearings in both Westinghouse and General Electric. '°°
In granting renewals in these cases, the Commission, in keeping with the
Uniform Policy, acknowledged its duty to scrutinize anticompetitive behavior by
owners of broadcast subsidiaries. 10 ' In Westinghouse the FCC stated that the
94 Id. The Commission also concluded that Philco was not a "party in interest." Id,
" The court of appeals vacated the dismissal of Philco's request and ordered a hearing.
Philco Corp. v. FCC, 293 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1961). Even when forced to confront the issue,
however, the FCC continued to try to sidestep it. On remand, the FCC still granted renewal, but
it also directed NBC to return the Philadelphia stations to Westinghouse in exchange for the Ohio
stations it had given up, and to forfeit the $3 million it had paid Westinghouse. 37 F.C.C. 427
(1964). In taking this action, the Commission noted that it was not holding that NBC lacked the
basic qualifications to be a broadcast licensee. Id. at 448. The Commission stated that NBC's
longstanding and generally meritorious broadcast history and its contributions to American
broadcasting constituted the overriding factor. Id. Unconditional renewal, however, would be
contrary to the public interest in the face of the misconduct, the Commission added. Id.
Therefore, the Commission fashioned a remedy to fit the specific misconduct in the Philadelphia-
Cleveland exchange. Id. at 449-50.
96
 44 F.C.C. 2778 (1962).
" 45 F.C.C. 1592 (1964).
95 See 44 F.C.C. at 2779 and 45 F.C.C. at 1592.
99 See 44 F.C.C. at 2779 and 45 F.C.C. at 1593. Then Attorney General William P.
Rogers remarked that the misconduct constituted "as serious instances of bid-rigging and price
fixing 'as have been charged in the more than half-century of the Sherman Act." Id.
'°° See 44 F.C.C. at 2785 and 45 F.C.C. at 1598.
See 44 F.C.C. at 2783 and 45 F.C.C. at 1593.
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misconduct in question was willful, recurring, and recent, a background that
militated against renewal.'" In General Electric, the Commission noted that the
misconduct was substantially identical to the wrongdoing found in Westing-
house. 10' In both cases, however, the Commission found that mitigating factors
overrode the negative behavior of the licensees. The FCC noted that remedial
measures had been taken by both parent companies in order to prevent a recur-
rence of the questionable conduct.'" The Commission was also impressed by
the lack of horizontal connection in the corporate structure between the
wrongdoers and the broadcast operations. 1 °5
 This corporate structure, the
Commission reasoned, insulated the broadcast division from the
misconduct.'" Finally, the FCC noted that the misconduct, although criminal,
was outweighed by the longstanding "uncommonly good" (Westinghouse)' 07
and "meritorious" (General Electric) 1 m broadcast records of the applicants.
Thus, Commission decisionmaking concerning character qualifications of
broadcast license applicants and their parent corporations reveals a complex
history. While experiencing difficulty in formulating a character standard, the
Commission, in its Uniform Policy and through later adjudication developed
three basic considerations. First, the seriousness of nonbroadcast misdeeds was
to be measured in part by the degree to which personnel engaged in broadcast
operations were involved. If broadcast functions were divorced completely
from the illegal activity, the misdeeds' impact on renewal would be slight. Se-
cond, the willfulness, persistence, and recency of the misconduct in question
were to be weighed as factors on a case-by-case basis. Third, nonbroadcast and
broadcast misconduct may be counterbalanced by longstanding high-quality
service in the public interest. Cases such as NBC, Westinghouse, and General Elec-
tric, however, show that in practice, the Commission has been lenient in apply-
ing the standards developed through the earlier case law and set forth in the
Uniform Policy. In so acting, the FCC focused more on continued service in the
public interest than on taking punitive measures. It is against the background
of this approach that RKO General, Inc. was decided.
II. RKO GENERAL, INC.: THE FCC'S DECISION
RKO General, Inc.'" presented to the Commission character issues similar
to those encountered in prior cases. Like NBC, RKO involved broadcast-
related misconduct by the licensee."° The facts of RKO also revealed non-
broadcast misdeeds by the licensee's parent corporation, General Tire.'" In
this respect, RKO resembled Westinghouse and General Electric. In assessing the
102
 44 F.C.C. at 2783.
'°' 45 F.C.C. at 1593.
104
 See 44 F,C.C. at 2784-85 and 45 F.C.C. at 1594-95.
10' See 44 F.C.C. at 2780 and 45 F.C.C. at 1593.
106 Id.
1 " 44 F.C.C. at 2780.
10 ' 45 F.C.C. at 1594, 1596.
100
 78 F.C.C.2d 1 (1980).
10 Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 4-5.
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character issues raised by RKO, however, the Commission applied the
character standard more stringently than it did in these earlier cases. This sec-
tion of the casenote will describe the Commission's opinion in RKO as it relates
to the character standard set forth in the Uniform Policy. Specifically, the discus-
sion will address the FCC's handling of broadcast-related misconduct,
nonbroadcast-related misconduct, and mitigating factors.
A. Broadcast-Related Wrongdoing
The direct licensee misconduct addressed in RKO involved reciprocal
trade practices, the filing of inaccurate annual financial reports, and a general
lack of candor on the part of RKO in dealing with the Commission. Because of
the prospective nature of licensing, the Commission considered an examina-
tion of these matters important because past broadcast-related misconduct is
an especially good predictor of future licensee misconduct. In examining
RKO's broadcast-related misconduct, the Commission reviewed three mat-
ters: reciprocal trade practices, inaccurate annual financial reports, and lack of
candor.
The FCC first examined the issue of reciprocal trade practices as evidenc-
ed by General Tire's efforts in the 1960's to induce General Tire suppliers to
advertise on RKO stations." 2 The Commission found these practices to be a
willful violation of law.'" In support of this conclusion, the FCC noted that
coercive reciprocity has been clearly illegal since the 1930's" 4 and that the
practices engaged in by General Tire included coercive measures.''' The Com-
mission observed further that while the law was less clear on noncoercive
reciprocal dealings than coercive reciprocity, 16 such activity probably would
be illegal if the specific aim were to exclude competitors.'" Finally, the FCC
expressed the view that even to the extent that General Tire's activities were
not coercive or unlawful, such practices were clearly contrary to the public in-
terest standard and constituted a willful violation of FCC policy." 8
In addition to finding that the reciprocal trade activities constituted willful
licensee misconduct, the Commission noted also that the practices were not
isolated incidents. 119 The FCC found, on the contrary, that during the period
1960-1967 General Tire sought to induce companies to advertise on RKO sta-
tions by making it a condition for doing business with General Tire.' 2° The for-
mal establishment of the "trade relations" division at General Tire in 1961
712 Id. at 40.
JI 3 Id. at 43-44. On this issue the Commission disagreed with the ALJ's conclusion that
the reciprocal trade practices were not clearly illegal in the 1960's and, therefore, did not con-
stitute a willful violation of law. 78 F.C.C.2d at 379-80.
'" 78 F.C.C.2d at 34, 43-44.
" 5 The Commission cited, for example, the case of Equitable Life Assurance Society,
where certain evidence indicated that that company felt compelled to advertise on RKO stations
in order to continue selling insurance to General Tire. Id. at 44.
1 " Id. at 34.
" 7 Id.
" 6 Id. at 38, 43-47.
19 Id. at 38-43.




showed that the practice was an integral part of the company's business.' 2 '
While the conduct itself occurred fifteen to twenty years ago, the Commission
continued, the program terminated only after the Department of Justice filed
an antitrust suit against General Tire.'" In conclusion, the Commission stated
that this misconduct, while not recent, constituted such a willful and persistent
pattern of wrongdoing, that its remoteness was immaterial.'" Consequently,
the FCC held that the reciprocal trade practices were "unequivocally im-
proper" and constituted an independent disqualifying factor in the license
renewal decision. 124
In addition to finding that RKO had engaged in reciprocal trade prac-
tices, the Commission found that RKO had knowingly filed inaccurate annual
financial reports with the Commission during the 1970's.'" In this context, the
Commission focused on RKO's improper reporting of barter and trade trans-
actions. "6 This matter involved RKO's disregard of a 1972 Commission direc-
tive to account for such transactions by general ledger method.'" It was not
until 1977 that RKO changed its accounting system in accordance with that re-
quirement.'" The Commission found that RKO knew the barter transactions
were not being accounted for in the manner required by the FCC and that
RKO willfully continued to file inaccurate reports.'" Additionally, the Com-
mission noted that the RKO's practices showed a persistent lack of control over
barter transactions, constituting "reckless indifference to [RKO's] respon-
sibilities as a licensee."'" The Commission concluded that RKO had
displayed willful and repeated misconduct through 1976 by submitting false
financial reports. As with reciprocity, the FCC found this misconduct to be an
independent disqualifying factor.
The Commission also addressed RKO's lack of candor with the FCC.' 3 '
This matter was considered important because licensee honesty is crucial to the
protection of the public interest. 132
 The Commission was concerned especially
with RKO's misleading statements and its pattern of minimal disclosure
throughout the licensing proceedings. First, the FCC criticized RKO's denial
of allegations concerning RKO's inaccurate reporting of barter and trade
transactions.'" The Commission found that by referring to these charges as
"sheer speculation,"'" RKO had compounded its initial deception.'" A sec-
121
 Id, at 39.
' 22 Id. at 46. The suit was filed in March, 1967. Id. at 8 SPe note 15 supra.
' 23 78 F.C.C.2c1 at 46-47.
12' Id. at 32-33, 46-47.
125 Id. at 80. The fact of the inaccuracies was conceded by RKO, although willfulness
was not. Id.
126 Id. at 88.
123
 Id. at 80.
1 " Id. at 86-87.
1 " Id, at 88.
130
 Id. at 89.
131
 Id, at 92.
' 32 Id, at 97-98.
133 Id. at 101-03.
194 Id. at 102.
133 Id. at 103. The Commission rejected RKO's contention that the FCC had failed to
designate the lack of candor issue for hearing in contravention of § 309(e) of the Communications
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and matter reflecting lack of candor, the Commission noted, was RKO's
failure to disclose the SEC investigation of General Tire and its subsidiaries.' 36
FCC rules require disclosure of formal investigations.'" In failing to comply
with Commission rules, the FCC concluded, RKO once again had willfully
misled the Commission.'" Finally, the Commission found that in 1976 RKO
denied allegations of the General Tire wrondgoing which resulted in the SEC
investigation when RKO officials must have known them to be true.'"
Having considered the broadcast-related misconduct, the Commission
found it to be willful, repeated, and, except in the case of the reciprocal trade
practices, recent. In view of the standard set forth in the Uniform Policy, the
Commission concluded that this wrongdoing served to disqualify RKO on the
basis of character deficiencies. Broadcast-related misdeeds, however, were not
the only flaws the FCC found in RKO's character.
B. Nonbroadcast Misconduct
In addition to considering the broadcast-related issues of reciprocal trade
practices, inaccurate financial reports and lack of candor, the Commission ex-
amined the nonbroadcast misconduct of RKO's parent corporation, General
Tire.'" The Commission considered this misconduct relevant because it had
found the relationship between RKO and General Tire to be a close one."'
Due to this close corporate relationship, the FCC found that General Tire can
and has controlled the operations of RK0. 142 Thus, the Commission con-
cluded, General Tire's trustworthiness was an important factor in RKO's
license renewal.'"
The Commission found that General Tire had been engaged in a pattern
of serious misconduct over a long period of time.'" This misconduct involved
making improper domestic campaign contributions, defrauding corporate affil-
iates, making improper foreign payments, and maintaining improper foreign
accounts.'" In assessing the seriousness of General Tire's wrongdoing, the
FCC noted that it was not only willful and repeated, but that many of the prac-
tices persisted until the filing of a complaint by the SEC against General Tire in
1976) 46 Furthermore, the Commission noted General Tire's failure to remove
top management officials who had been involved in the wrongdoing. 147
Act, claiming that RKO clearly had "actual notice that its candor was in issue." Id. at 104.
"6 Id. at 99.
17 Id. See note 38 supra.
"6 78 F.C.C.2d at 98-99.
"9 Id. at 95. The Commission stated that RKO must have consulted top General Tire
officials in order to prepare its opposition to Community's petition since that petition concerned
General Tire misconduct. Id. at 95 & n.408.
H° Id. at 47.
14 ' Id. at 56, 58.
112 Id. at 62.
'" Id.
' 44 Id, at 63.
"5 Id.
1 " Id. at 69.
147 Id. at 110.
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Because of these extensive incidents and the close corporate relationship be-
tween General Tire and RKO, the Commission concluded that although the
General Tire misconduct was not grounds for disqualification in and of itself, it
must be given "substantial weight" in evaluating RKO's character qualifica-
tions. 148
C. Mitigating Factors
In conformity with the Uniform Policy, the Commission measured the
record of misconduct against two mitigating factors: (1) RKO's broadcast
record and (2) corrective action taken by RKO and General Tire to prevent a
recurrence of the misconduct. On both counts, the Commission found that
these factors were insufficient to outweigh the wrongdoing by the licensee and
its parent.
First, the Commission considered RKO's broadcast history.'" While ex-
tolling RKO for its contributions to educational broadcasting and the develop-
ment of new program sources, 150 the Commission nevertheless found that
RKO's record as a whole could not counterbalance its serious character defi-
ciencies. 151 In comparison with other Boston area television stations, for exam-
ple, the Commission found RKO to be deficient with respect to news, public
affairs, and local programming.' 52 RKO's performance, the FCC concluded,
was "within the bounds of average performance of all licensees," 153 a status in-
sufficient to outweigh the adverse findings made against RKO and General
Tire. ' 54
Second, the Commission addressed the remedial measures taken by RKO
and General Tire regarding their misconduct. These measures included enter-
ing into consent decrees with the SEC and Department of Justice, and the
subsequent proper recording of barter and trade transactions. 155 The Commis-
sion concluded that General Tire's and RKO's adherence to the Department
of Justice consent decree enjoining them from engaging in reciprocal trade
practices through 1980 was an inadequate remedial measure, because such
compliance gave no assurance that the licensee would act with propriety in the
future.' 56 With respect to the issues raised by the SEC investigation, the FCC
concluded that efforts by RKO and General Tire to remedy the misdeeds
revealed by the Special Report were of little significance because they came only
after the SEC had initiated . a formal investigation.' 57 Furthermore, these
149 Id. at 71. The Commission claimed that "parental tolerance (and sometimes en-
couragement) of improper behavior and fiduciary neglect could well infect any of General Tire's
subsidiaries, including RKO." Id.
149 Id. at 105.
"° Id. at 105-06.
15 ' Id. at 106.
152 Id. at 107.
143 id.
144 Id, at 109.
444 Id. at 110-11.
196 Id. at 46-47.
'" Id. at 110.
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remedial measures were offset by General Tire's retention of the corporate offi-
cers responsible for the wrongdoing.' 58 Regarding the barter and trade records,
the Commission was not impressed by RKO's 1977 compliance with FCC
rules.'" In dismissing this later compliance as a mitigating factor, the Com-
mission noted that RKO did not institute this corrective program soon enough,
since the licensee was clearly on notice of FCC requirements as of 1972.' 6°
In summary, the Commission concluded that RKO lacked the requisite
character qualifications to remain the licensee of WNAC-TV. The FCC based
its conclusion, in part, on findings that RKO had exhibited willful, repeated
and, in some cases, recent misconduct directly related to its status as a Com-
mission licensee. In addition, the Commission concluded that the extensive
nonbroadcast misconduct of the licensee's parent corporation, General Tire,
was a substantial negative factor in assessing RKO's character qualifications
because of the close corporate connection between the two companies. Finally,
neither the "average" broadcast record of RKO, nor the remedial efforts by
RKO and General Tire were sufficient to mitigate these adverse findings and
conclusions.
III. THE SHORTCOMINGS OF RKO GENERAL, INC.
In RKO, the Commission departed from its prior lenient approach to
character evaluation in renewal cases, yet failed to replace the abandoned stan-
dards with workable guidelines. This section will discuss the Commission's
departure from prior FCC decisions that set out FCC policy and construed the
Communications Act with respect to character. The discussion will
demonstrate the Commission's failure in RKO to fashion a workable standard
to guide both licensees and the Commission in future cases. It will be argued
that in contrast with earlier cases, in RKO the Commission gave greater
scrutiny to the misconduct and less weight to the mitigating factors.
A. Broadcast-Related Wrongdoing
The relevance of broadcast-related misconduct by a licensee in license
renewal proceedings is undisputed. In RKO, the Commission correctly ex-
amined evidence of unlawful reciprocal dealings, false financial reports, and
lack of candor with the Commission. The FCC's conclusions, however,
diverged from the Commission's treatment of such behavior in other cases.' 6 '
For example, in RKO the FCC held that the RKO and General Tire trade
relations activities in the 1960's' 62 constituted a willful violation of law by the
licensee and was, therefore, an independent disqualifying factor.'" This con-




161 See note 168 infra.
tea 78 F.C.C.2d at 9.
163 Id. at 33.
164




earlier case involving RKO, RKO. General, Inc. (KI1J-TV). 165
 In NBC the
licensee had acquired broadcast stations through coercive use of its power to
grant network affiliation. 166
 Nevertheless, licensee was not found to lack the re-
quisite character qualifications to remain a broadcast licensee despite its clearly
anticompetitive broadcast-related conduct.'" In the KHJ-TV case, where
RKO applied for renewal of its Los Angeles television station, the Commission
reviewed the very same trade relations practices at issue in the Boston pro-
ceeding and came to the opposite conclusion.'" In granting renewal for KHJ-
TV, the Commission decided that the reciprocal dealings in question did not
constitute a willful and knowing violation of law because the antitrust law on
reciprocity was in flux at the time of the alleged wrongdoing.' 69 This inter-
pretation of the law was later affirmed by the appeals court, which rejected a
competing applicant's argument that the 1960's trade relations practices re-
quired disqualification of RK0. 17° Although additional evidence was revealed
in the Boston proceedings, the Commission relied largely on the activities
already assessed in the KHJ-TV hearing to support the finding of improper,
coercive, reciprocity in the Boston case."' Thus, it was on the basis of conduct
already found by the FCC and the appeals court not to be in willful violation of
law that reciprocity was adjudged an independent disqualifying factor.
In addition to changing significantly its own assessment of the law
concerning reciprocal trade practices, the Commission in RKO also failed to
show how that misconduct might bear upon RKO's ability to operate WNAC-
TV in the future. Because these practices ended some time ago, it is unlikely
that they are indicative of future conduct. In the Uniform Policy the Commission
stated that violations of law which occurred in the distant past, followed by a
period of good conduct, would be of minimal importance in the FCC's evalua-
tion of character.' 72
This standard was applied recently in a 1980 FCC decision, Miami Valley
Broadcasting Corp.'" In that case, the Commission discounted numerous viola-
tions of law on the part of the licensee's parent corporation because the pattern
10 44 F.C.C.2d 123 (1973).
166 See text at notes 85-95 supra.
1°7 37 F.C.C. at 448.
1611
 44 F.C.C.2d at 130. While the composition of the Commission has changed since
1973, it is suggested that standards should survive such changes in order to preserve fairness
towards licensees as a whole. The Commission itself stated that despite the need for some flex-
ibility to accommodate changes in FCC membership, "... it is nonetheless important to have a
high degree of consistency of decision and of clarity in our basic policies." Policy Statement on
Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393 (1965).
16°
 44 F.C.C.2d at 129-30. Trade relations programs were prevalent between the end of
World War II and the 1960's in many industries. Indeed, in 1962 a national Trade Relations
Association was formed. 78 F.C.C.2a at 256-57.
170
 In Fidelity Television, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 684 (D.C. Cir. 1975), the appeals
court noted that RKO's role in the reciprocal dealings was substantially less than that of General
Tire's other divisions. Id. at 697 n.23.
171
 78 F.C.C.2d at 136 & n.l.
"2
 42 F.C.C.2d at 402.
"3
 47 R.R.2d 445.
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of violations ceased eight years prior to the date of the decision. 14 In RKO,
however, the FCC did not comply with the recency requirement set forth in the
Unaform Policy. The facts showed that General Tire not only complied with the
Department of justice consent decree, but, even prior to that suit the company
had dismantled its trade relations division. Yet the Commision, on the basis of
arguably legal activity, which occurred 10 to 20 years ago, concluded that the
practices in question indicated that RKO could not be trusted to operate in the
public interest. ' 75
Regarding inaccuracies in RKO's annual financial reports and its lack of
candor, the Commission displayed similar inconsistency. The Commission
held that some of these alleged deceptions alone could have resulted in RKO's
disqualification.'" This holding, however, seems incongruous with other cases
where such deceptive practices resulted in disqualification.'"
With respect to the inaccurate accounting of barter and trade transactions,
the Commission correctly noted that RKO delayed until 1977 the conversion to
the general ledger method as required by the FCC in 1972.'" The Commission
not only found that the resulting errors amounted to willful misrepresentation
but also discounted RKO's later willingness to reveal its accounting errors to
the Commission and take corrective action.'" In finding this violation an in-
dependently disqualifying factor, the FCC failed to conform to prior rulings,
and to its assessment of its own financial disclosure forms. For example, in
prior decisions, a finding of willful misrepresentation in reporting barter and
trade revenues required a showing of intent and of lack of good faith.'"
The facts of RKO are unclear on this issue. When licensees were first
notified in 1972 that they would be required to report these transactions by
general ledger method, much latitude was given to them with regard to the
manner and timing of reporting items. 18 ' In fact, the Commission itself had
noted, just prior to the RKO decision, that there were problems with the design
"1 Id. at 487. While Miami involved nonbroadcast misconduct in the form of numerous
securities laws violations, the case is relevant also to illustrate the FCC's reluctance to view
misconduct in the distant past as a disqualifying factor. Id.
"5 78 F.C.C.2d at 46-47.
"6 Id. at 81.
I" In WOKO, Inc., 10 F.C.C. 454 (1944), for example, a corporation was denied
license renewal because it had misrepresented the true ownership of its capital stock for 12 years.
Id. at 466, 468. In his dissenting statement in RKO, Commissioner Robert E. Lee commented
that the RKO misconduct "hardly reaches the proportions of the 'deception' in [WOKOI
[and] also fails to reach the proportions of a disqualifying lack of control such as that found in
United Broadcasting Co., where control problems led to serious programming abuses." 78
F.C.C.2d at 137 (citations omitted).
in' Id. at 86-87.
19 Id. 81, 110.
Ig° Taft Broadcasting Corp., 76 F.C.C.2d 45 (1980), illustrates this point. The Com-
' mission in that case approved an application to assign a license to Westinghouse Broadcasting
Corporation despite criminal convictions of the parent corporation on charges of numerous false
certifications to government agencies. Id. at 46, 51. The Commission relied, in part, on a show-
ing that top management of the parent company was not aware of the improper conduct, and,
therefore, lacked the requisite intent. Id. at 48.
Is' Notice of Proposed Rule Making, BC Docket No. 80-190, 45 Fed. Reg. 35370,
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of the forms, and that stations using them might not be faulted for encounter-
ing difficulty. 182 Due to this admitted confusion regarding the form, it is
reasonable to doubt that this violation was willful. 1 e"
Just as with the issue of the annual financial reports, the Commission also
failed to show that RKO acted willfully with respect to the candor issues. These
matters concerned RKO's opposition to Community's petition demanding
that RKO comply with FCC disclosure rules concerning barter and trade mat-
ters, RKO's failure to make a timely report of the SEC investigation of
General Tire, and RKO's opposition to Community's petition to reopen.
Concerning the first matter, RKO's April, 1977, pleading in opposition to
Community's petition to reveal the inaccuracies in the financial reports does
not appear to approach disqualifying proportions. At the time the opposition
was filed by RKO, the Special Review Committee established by the SEC con-
sent decree had not yet completed its investigation of this matter. The pleading
by RKO pointed out that the FCC would have complete information regarding
any possible inaccuracies when the Committee issued its report in June,
1977. 184 Given the timing, RKO's reponse to Community's pleading does not
rise to the level of intentional misrepresentation, and indeed seems quite
reasonable.
35372 (1980). A month prior to the RKO decision the Commission made the following comment
with respect to the annual financial report forms:
[T]he current form and instructions allow considerable latitude for licensee judg-
ment in allocating revenue and expense accounts to the various line items ....
[T]he current financial data are neither reliable in terms of what ecohomic
characteristic is measured by specific line items, nor are they consistent across dif-
ferent stations in the sense that the financial data are not allocated to the various
line items in the same manner by different stations. We believe that these prob-
lems are principally due to inadequacies of the design of the form itself and are not




 In his dissenting statement, Commissioner Robert E. Lee viewed the barter and
trade inaccuracies as "sloppiness" at worst. 78 F.C.C.2d at 137. See note 177 supra, The major-
ity opinion itself contains language which indicates the FCC's own hesitation on the subject of
willfulness:
Plainly, if disclosed to the Commission, these persistent errors on RKO's annual
financial reports would have revealed the licensee's continued inability — or unwill-
ingness — to carry out procedures necessary for compliance with the Commission's
reporting requirements. That kind of finding could have had serious consequences
in a renewal or comparative proceeding. Consequently, RKO may have had suffi-
cient motivation to willfully conceal these errors. In any event, RKO's conduct
with respect to these matters was simply unacceptable.
78 F.C.C.2d at 89 (emphasis added). RKO raised procedural objections to the Commission's
consideration of several matters, including.the reporting of barter and trade transactions and lack
of candor. Id. at 91, 103. With respect to the barter and trade issue, RKO claimed that it had not
been given sufficient notice that the matter would be of such decisional significance, and that the
FCC had not given this issue a full hearing, as required by S 309(e) of the Communications Act.
Id. at 89. While it is possible that the procedural issues may enter into the decision by the United
States Court of Appeals, these matters will not be considered in this casenote.
184 Opposition to Petition for Order Requiring RKO General, Inc. to Comply with Sec-
tion 1.65 of the Commission's Rules at 3 (April, 1977).
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Turning to the second candor issue, the Commission noted that RKO
failed to report the SEC inquiry in February, 1976) 85 Such nondisclosure, the
Commission found, displayed RKO's failure to comply with FCC rules' 88 and
evidenced lack of candor by RKO in dealing with the FCC . 187 It is not clear,
however, that RKO had an obligation to make the report at that time. Prior
FCC decisions, most notably Lake Erie Broadcasting Co.,'" do not support the
FCC's conclusion that RKO violated FCC rules. In Lake Erie it was held that
investigations, unlike formal charges, did not trigger the reporting require-
ment)" When RKO filed its opposition, no formal charges had been filed
against RKO or General Tire by the SEC. Thus, under Lake Erie, the
disclosure rule does not apply. Moreover, even if it is assumed that RKO com-
mitted a violation of the disclosure rules, RKO, relying on Lake Erie, reason-
ably could have concluded that disclosure was not required. Under such cir-
cumstances, the violation could not be considered willful. In addition, the
FCC's 1976 revision of its renewal application form pointed in the direction of
requiring less, rather than more, disclosure of pending suits by renewal ap-
plicants than by applicants seeking to construct or acquire a broadcast
station)" Therefore, in view of prior case law,'" the FCC's decision to dis-
qualify RKO seems unwarranted.
Finally, the Commission used hindsight in order to show willfullness on
the part of RKO with respect to the opposition to Community's petition to re-
open. While many of Community's allegations regarding General Tire
misconduct later turned out to be true, the FCC opinion does not hold that
RKO officials had actual knowledge of that misconduct when the opposition
was filed)" This fact tends to undermine the Commission's finding that RKO
acted in intentional disregard for truth.
With respect to RKO's broadcast-related misconduct, the Commission's
conclusions generally were not in keeping with prior decisions'and FCC policy.
The alleged violations of law and FCC rules lose their force when examined in
conjunction with earlier FCC opinions. For example, the FCC failed to show
clearly that RKO's reporting and candor violations were willful, as required by
the Uniform Policy. Furthermore, with respect to reciprocity, the Commission
"5 78 F.C.C.2d at 99. RKO reported the inquiry on May 14, 1976, four days after the
SEC filed its formal complaint. Id.
186 Id.
"7 Id.
' 99 Lake Erie Broadcasting Co., 33 F.C.C.2d 1009 (1972).
189 Id. at 1011-12.
19° In Revision of FCC Form 303, Application for Renewal of Broadcast Station License
and Certain Rules Relating Thereto, 61 F.C.C.2d 27, 29-30 (1976), the Commission noted that
the reporting of litigation involvement required by renewal applicants is not as extensive as that
required from new applicants. Thus, the Commission revised the new television renewal forms to
pertain to matters such as felonies, unlawful lotteries, antitrust violations, and certain other
misconduct reasonably related to the applicant's ability to operate its station in the public in-
terest, such as fraud, unfair labor practices and discrimination. Id. at 30.
19 ' In Southern Broadcasting Co., 57 F.C.C.2d 891 (1976), for example, the Commis-
sion renewed a license despite the licensee's violation of Commission disclosure rules by failure to
report antitrust actions against companies where its stockholders had interests. Id. at 895-96.
192 78 F.C.C.2d at 95.
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disqualified RKO for questionable conduct which occurred in the remote past,
again departing from the Uniform Policy and other post-policy cases.
While the Commission's action in RKO may induce licensees to act with
more vigilence in adhering to antitrust laws and in reporting questionable mat-
ters to the FCC, the Commission's inconsistent application of FCC policies
and rules is disturbing. As a result of RKO licensees are now aware that they
stand to lose their licenses for a broad range of misconduct, but because of the
Commission's failure to address discrepancies between RKO and earlier cases,
it is unclear how the FCC will determine that conduct has reached disqualify-
ing proportions. The FCC's unpredictable approach to these issues under-
mines faith in the Commission's adjudicatory process as a means for determin-
ing who will best serve the public interest.
B. Nonbroadcast Misconduct
The Commission gave substantial weight to nonbroadcast misconduct by
General Tire in disqualifying RKO. In this regard, the Commission gave
lengthy consideration to the relationship between RKO and General Tire. The
significance of this corporate connection, in the Commission's view, stemmed
from a legitimate concern that broadcast-related wrongdoing might result from
the nonbroadcast misconduct. The FCC's analysis of this problem, however,
does not comport with its reasoning in prior cases.
In considering nonbroadcast misconduct in its evaluation of RKO's
character qualifications, the Commission reviewed the severe and extensive
nature of the misconduct revealed in the SEC investigation of General Tire.' 93
The focus of the Commission's concern was the close RKO-General Tire rela-
tionship.'" The Commission pointed to RKO's status as a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary of General Tire and to the ability of General Tire to control RK0. 195
The FCC's heavy reliance on this relationship, however, raises the question
whether the existence or absence of close corporate connections between a
parent company and a broadcast subsidiary requires that the transgressions of
the parent must be attributed to the subsidiary in assessing character. Prior
decisions indicate that the answer to this question is negative. For example,
some of the most important officers of Westinghouse Electric Corporation, the
parent of Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., sat on the board of directors of the
broadcast subsidiary.'" Yet in Westinghouse, the Commission renewed 14
Westinghouse licenses despite criminal convictions of the parent corporation
on charges of bidrigging and price-fixing. 197
 By contrast, in RKO, the Commis-
'" Id. at 63.
19+ Id. at 50-53.
' 95 Id.
199
 Westinghouse Broadcasting Company is also a wholly-owned subsidiary and the
parent company plays a major role in the operation of the broadcast subsidiary. 44 F.C.C. at
2787-88. Furthermore, Westinghouse has a long history of antitrust involvement. Id. at 2781. Cf.
Microband Corp. of America, 44 R.R.2d 1490, 1492 n.4 (1978) (no FCC action despite involve-
ment of overlapping officer in SEC violations).
197
 44 F.C.C. at 2779.
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sion concluded on the basis of a single overlapping officer, that the potential for
"infection" of the broadcast subsidiary by the aberrant parent warranted
substantial negative weight in the licensing decision.' 99 This conclusion signals
a significant change from prior application of the Uniform Policy, as evidenced
in Westinghouse. The RKO decision failed, however, to explain the reasons for
this change in approach. Thus, companies investing in broadcast subsidiaries
are without a guide as to how their general operations might affect the sub-
sidiaries' retention of broadcast licenses.
One effect of the FCC's treatment of nonbroadcast misconduct in RKO
might be that companies will reorganize their corporate structure to insulate
the broadcast subsidiary from the operations of the parent company. This type
of corporate reorganization, however, would be merely a change in form, not
substance. It is unlikely that eliminating overlapping officers and directors will
alter the basic nature of the corporate structure. The parent-subsidiary rela-
tionship itself precludes autonomy for the broadcast subsidiary no matter who
is nominally in charge.
In RKO, the Commission's application of the Uniform Policy to nonbroad-
cast misconduct extends beyond earlier cases, such as Westinghouse. The deci-
sion indicates that the Commission will scrutinize more extensively the ac-
tivities of a parent corporation. In establishing this stricter approach, however,
the Commission failed to provide guidelines as to how it will exercise it.
C. Mitigating Factors
The Uniform Policy provided that a licensee's unlawful behavior might be
outweighed by mitigating factors.' 99 Factors considered in the past and in RKO
included broadcast recordm and acts consistent with promises of future com-
pliance. 20 ' In RKO, however, the Commission weighed mitigating factors dif-
ferently than it did in prior cases.
The Commission discussed RKO's broadcast record in some detail, com-
paring its Boston performance to that of other local broadcasters. 202 In doing
so, the Commission concluded that RKO's "average" performance was not
"sufficiently meritorious to overcome the negative impact of the
misconduct. " 203 This conclusion diverges from the Commission's prior state-
ment concerning RKO's broadcast record. In the 1973 KHJ-TV case, the
FCC considered "RKO's unblemished record as a broadcaster covering more
than 25 years" as a mitigating factor with respect to the allegedly illegal
198 78 F.C.C.2d at 71. The Commission's inconsistency is further illustrated by compar-
ing RKO's emphasis on corporate relationship with more recent cases. For example, in Cowles
Florida Broadcasting, 60 F.C.C.2d 372 (1976), the FCC granted license renewal despite com-
mon ownership by the parent corporation both of the broadcast facility and the subsidiary branch
involved in the illegal activity.
199 42 F.C.C.2d at 402.
200 See, e.g., General Electric, 45 F.C.C. at 1595-96; Westinghouse, 44 F.C.C. at 2783-84.




202 Id, at 105.
January 1981]	 CASENOTES	 433
reciprocal trade practices.'" In discounting this assessment with respect to the
misconduct revealed in the Boston proceeding, the Commission engaged in a
rather cursory quantitative comparison of WNAC-TV's performance with that
of two other Boston stations.'" Given the complexities of comparative analyses
of broadcast performance and, more important, the Commission's own rejec-
tion of quantitative analysis as a proper means for reaching comparative licens-
ing decisions,'" the discounting of RKO's past broadcast record appears un-
warranted.'"
Comparison with other FCC decisions also illustrates the Commission's
inconsistent approach in evaluating RKO's broadcast record as a mitigating
factor. For example, Teleprompter Cable Systems, Inc. 2" stands in contrast to RKO
with respect to the application of the balancing test. In Teleprompter the presi-
dent of the company had been convicted of bribery in the acquisition of local
cable television franchises.'" In renewing Teleprompter's license, the Com-
mission stated that this broadcast-related misconduct, serious as it was, was
outweighed in large part by the applicant's leadership in the development of
cable television. 210 RKO's 38-year history of pioneering in broadcasting,
however, was given much less consideration.
In addition to discounting RKO's broadcast record, the Commission gave
little weight to RKO's remedial actions as a mitigating factor.'" This judge-
ment further demonstrated the FCC's departure from standards applied in
prior cases. The Commission did not credit RKO's revision of the barter and
trade accounts, or its compliance with the SEC and Department of Justice con-
sent decrees because these actions were taken only after the institution of pro-
ceedings against RKO and General Tire."' This disregard for remedial ac-
tion, however, is inconsistent with the Commission's predictive function as
reflected in decisions such as Westinghouse213 and General Electric. 214 In those
cases, the Commission credited remedial measures commenced after criminal
convictions." 5
204
 44 F.C.C.2d at 130.
222 78 F.C.C.2d at 106-07. Specifically, the Commission noted the percentage of time
devoted to entertainment and sports, news, local programming and "all other categories." Id. at
106.
206 In 1977 the Commission expressly rejected the application of percentage of time
figures as "inherently deficient." Formulation of Policies Relating to the Broadcast Renewal Ap-
plicant, Etc., 66 F.C.C.2d 419, 428 (1977).
207 The ALJ in the Boston proceeding found that RKO had exceeded its prior renewal
commitment in its overall programming throughout the 1966-69 license period. 78 F.C.C.2d at
341. This fact was disregarded by the Commission in making its final decision.
205 40 F.C.C.2d 1027 (1973).
209 Id.
"° Id. at 1035. The Commission added that if Teleprompter were a new applicant,
"other considerations might obtain." The company's long record of leadership, however, con-
stituted evidence that the licensee would play a major role in serving the public interest in the
future. Id,
2'1 78 F.C.C.2d at 110-11.
"2 Id. at 110.
213 44 F.C.C. at 2784-85.
2" 45 F.C.C. at 1596-97.
212 See 44 F.C.C. at 2784-85 and 45 F.C.C. at 1594, 1596.
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The FCC's brief consideration of mitigating factors revealed two flaws.
First, the Commission did not give RKO the same treatment accorded other
licensees that had acted unlawfully, and thus failed to apply with consistency
the standards developed in the Uniform Policy and later cases. Second, it provid-
ed no indication of how much weight was accorded the various factors, nor an
explanation for its change in policy. Consequently, the apparently rejected ap-
proach was not replaced by a new one.
D. The Nature of the FCC's Action: A Procedure Without a Purpose
The statutory role of the FCC is to provide the public with the best possi-
ble broadcasting. 2 " Under the Communications Act, the Commission is sup-
posed to further the public interest through the licensing process. 217 In confor-
mity with its limited purpose,the Commission in the past has not removed or
withheld licenses to penalize illegal conduct. Instead, it has denied a license on-
ly where the conduct in question indicated that the applicant could not be
trusted to operate in the public interest. Thus, the Commission has fashioned
remedies other than completely denying license renewal in cases where an in-
cumbent licensee was found to have acted wrongfully.
For example, in NBC, a case involving broadcast-related misconduct, the
Commission did not strip NBC of the licenses at issue because of character
deficiencies. In so deciding the FCC noted that it would not serve the public in-
terest to find that NBC lacked the basic qualifications to own and operate
broadcast stations. 2 " Similarly, in Westinghouse and General Electric, where the
parent company had engaged in serious nonbroadcast-related criminal activ-
ity, the Commission renewed the licenses. As with NBC the Commission de-
cided that it would not be in the public interest to deny the Westinghouse and
General Electric licenses.
Decisions such as NBC, Westinghouse, and General Electric are cases where
the Commission defined public interest, in part, by acknowledging a need to
maintain stability in the broadcasting industry. That apparent objective was
achieved by minimizing character deficiencies and emphasizing the benefits to
be gained through continued service by the licensees. The results were also
justified by the FCC's conclusion that the misconduct would not affect future
broadcasting. In both respects RKO represents a new approach. The Commis-
sion not only diverged from the notion of industry stability, but also failed to
show how the past misconduct of RKO and General Tire would affect broad-
casting prospectively. Thus, the Commission's action was not remedia1, 2 " and
216 47 U.S.C. 5 151 (1976).
217 47 U.S.C. 5 309(a) (1976).
216 37 F.C.C. at 4480. See text at notes 85-95 supra. The Commission applied a similar
remedy in Melody Music, hie., a 1966 decision granting renewal to licensees who had engaged in
unlawful conduct, on the condition that they divest the station to a qualified applicant within a
year. 2 F.C.C.2d 958 (1966).
"9 Two other FCC decisions illustrate this point. In Melody Music, Inc., 2 F.C.C.2d
958 (1966), the Commission stated that to deny license renewal to the owners who had engaged
in allegedly illegal conduct would have constituted a "punishment" beyond that which they had
already suffered. Id. at 962. The Commission noted further that "I u]nder the statutes applicable
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its statement in RKO that "denial of a license is not a penalty" appears incon-
sistent."°
Such treatment is clearly at odds with the FCC's handling of character
cases since the Uniform Policy. The FCC neither explained this departure nor
defined a practicable approach to character to replace the old one. The result of
this action was twofold. First, the decision furnished little explanation for its
shift in applying FCC policies, leaving licensees and applicants with no basis
on which to predict the outcome of future cases. Second, by taking a punitive,
rather than remedial, approach, the Commission apparently has established
itself as the enforcer of a variety of laws where the transgressor directly or in-
directly holds a broadcast license. Such an extension of power is likely to create
new problems for the Commission while leaving old problems unresolved.
IV. RKO GENERAL, INC.: THE AFTERMATH
The Communications Act of 1934 authorized the Federal Communica-
tions Commission to establish character qualifications to evaluate applicants
for broadcast licenses."' History illustrates that this has not been an easy task
for the Commission. In making its decisions, however, the FCC cannot func-
tion without standards to predict how applicants might operate in the future.
The FCC has not ignored its mandate to develop standards. Through adjudi-
cation and policy-making, the Commission developed certain criteria for evalu-
ating character.
Those efforts have resulted in an evaluation of an applicant's misconduct
by reference to its willfulness, its repetitiveness, and its recency. These three
factors are examined because the FCC perceived them to be the best indicators
of future performance. While these guidelines may form legitimate points of
departure for Commissioner review, RKO, in conjunction with 'antecedent
cases, shows that the FCC has experienced difficulty in applying them with
consistency.
The Commission's failure to devise a consistent approach to character
issues was pointed out by Commissioners Joseph R. Fogarty and Anne P.
Jones in December, 1979, one month prior to the announcement of the RKO
here, our function and authority in this case do not encompass punishment." U. at 963-64. Ten
years later, in Cowles Florida Broadcasting, 60 F.C.C.2d 372 (1976), the Commission expressed
a similar view. In that case the renewal applicant's character was questioned because it had been
involved in mail fraud and had made an unauthorized studio move. Id. at 389-93. The Commis-
sion renewed the license, noting that it is not the role of the FCC to punish misconduct by exer-
cising its power to deny license renewal. Id. at 405-06.
220
 Even assuming RKO was unfit to remain a licensee, the FCC still could have taken
far less punitive measures. If the Commission's goal was to see that WNAC-TV would be
operated by a qualified licensee, it might have granted renewal to RKO conditioned upon divest-
ment to a qualified applicant. This was the remedy chosen in Melody Music, 2 F.C.C.2d at 964,
and NBC, 37 F.C.C. 427 (1964). At the time of the RKO decision this was a viable alternatiVe
because RKO had proposed a sale of the Boston license to New England Television, a competing
applicant. Instead, the Commission denied renewal of three television stations, and implied that
the action might affect RKO's other 13 licenses. 78 F.C.C.2d at 118.
221 47 U.S.C. S 308(b) (1976).
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action. 222 Commissioners Fogarty and Jones objected to the FCC's ad hoc ap-
proach to character matters and urged that all decisions based on such ques-
tions be postponed until a policy statement could be issued. 223 Nevertheless,
the Commission proceeded to a decision in RKO. It is evident, however, that
the Commission fell short of resolving the character issue through that deci-
sion.
Adjudication since RKO further illustrates that RKO did not produce a
workable approach. For example, in Miami Valley Broadcasting Corp. 224 the
Commission found General Electric qualified to go forward with its proposed
merger with Cox Broadcasting Corporation. 225 The application was approved
despite General Electric's violation of at least nine government agencies'
regulations. 226 The challengers to the merger reminded the Commission of its
1962 warning to General Electric that further significant or widespread viola-
tions of antitrust laws or other federal regulations would seriously impair its
credibility as a broadcast licensee. 227 Nevertheless, the Commission granted
the merger. It based its decision on findings that General Electric neither acted
in bad faith nor with willful intent to violate the law. In addition, the FCC
relied on the absence of evidence that either broadcast operations or principals
were involved in the misconduct. 226 While the Miami decision left room for the
FCC to "take appropriate action" pending the outcome of certain Department
of Justice and grand jury investigations, 229 the decision based on existing
evidence was favorable. This result is difficult to reconcile with RKO, where
the Commission gave substantial weight to nonbroadcast-related violations. In
this sense, the Miami decision appears to be a return to the more lenient pre-
RKO standard. As such it indicates that the Commission did not develop a
viable approach to character in RKO, and it raises questions about what the
Commission hoped to achieve through RKO.
222 Central Texas Broadcasting Co., 74 F.C.C.2d 393, 413 (1979) (Fogarty and Jones,
Comm'rs, dissenting). The dissenting Commissioners took exception to the majority's designa-
tion for hearing on character issues prior to more clearly articulating its governing policy and
standards. It is ironic that both Commissioners Fogarty and Jones voted against RKO in the
renewal decision.
223 Id. The Commission directed its staff to make recommendations to clarify the FCC's
policy in such matters, although no results have been published as of this writing.
224 47 R.R.2d 445 (1980).
22' Id. at 509.
226 The agencies involved were the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, the Criminal and
Antitrust Divisions of the Department of Justice, the National Labor Relations Board, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Securities
and Exchange Commission, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, and the Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission. Id. at 481. In addition, the challengers cited General Elec-
tric's long history of antitrust.violations and, among other things, a propensity for withholding
information from government agencies. Id.
227
2" Id. at 483, 485, 487-88, 491. The character of Cox Broadcasting Corporation was
also at issue. The matters in question included a grand jury investigation relating to the sale
adVertising time at one of Cox's television stations. Id. at 475.
229 Id. at 509, 510.
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After RKO the question remains as to which direction the FCC will take in
evaluating future renewal applicants with respect to character. While the RKO
decision potentially marks a significant shift in the Commission's application of
the standards set forth in the Uniform Policy, there are hints, such as the Miami
case, that the Commission is not prepared to follow through in sustaining its
more aggressive approach to evaluating character.
CONCLUSION
RKO General, Inc. reveals a shift in FCC policy from favoring renewal ap-
plicants to taking a more aggressive approach towards evaluation of license
renewals. The Commission, through RKO, appears to be putting the broad-
casting industry on notice that the FCC will scrutinize more fully all aspects of
an applicant's nonbroadcast as well as broadcast business conduct in making a
character judgment. This approach, however, raises substantial questions as to
the Commission's role as an administrative agency concerned with broadcast
matters. While the FCC has the power to establish policy through licensing ad-
judication, it must do so with consistency and clarity. The RKO decision was
deficient in both respects.
JANET L. HOFFMAN
